A GSP double auction for smart exchange

DOIResolve DOI: http://doi.org/10.1109/CSCWD.2013.6581032
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Proceedings titleProceedings of the 2013 IEEE 17th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD 2013
Conference2013 IEEE 17th International Conference on Computer Supported Cooperative Work in Design, CSCWD 2013, 27 June 2013 through 29 June 2013, Whistler, BC
Article number6581032
Pages621626; # of pages: 6
SubjectBidding languages; Double auction; GSP auction; Preference elicitation; prefernce deduction; Reverse auction; strategic rules; Winner determination; Electronic commerce; Interactive computer systems; Sustainable development; Online systems
AbstractThe emerging dynamics of the digital e-markets are creating many opportunities with the vast growth and potential of online services and mobile technology. However, the sustainability of e-markets is uncertain due to industry and operational risks. While industry threats extend to the rapidly shifting powers, fuzzy dynamics, and fierce rivalry, this work examines an overlooked operational risk that relates to the fact present e-markets often constrain e-traders from strategic conduct. Such denial incites adverse reactions that cause e-market failures. In contrast, Smith invisible hand realizes the efficiency of the flexible strategic choice in free markets. Conveying strategies as rules may, also, accelerate the bidding lifecycles due to the automatic preference deduction of rules by the smart exchange. This work presents the RBBL rule based bidding language that enables free expressions of strategic rules in the bid structure, while proposing the GSPM generalized second price truthful matching double auction that computes stable, efficient and tractable outcomes with market profitability. The introduced smart exchange deliberates on the RBBL rules for automatic preference deduction while using the GSPM for winner determination, hence, improves sustainability with the rapid and stable e-trades, social efficiency, and self-prosperity of free choice. © 2013 IEEE.
Publication date
AffiliationNational Research Council Canada (NRC-CNRC)
Peer reviewedYes
NPARC number21270560
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Record identifiere1717380-627b-41f3-aa8a-4ca8f05192be
Record created2014-02-17
Record modified2016-05-09
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